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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the sentences courts have been imposing
for violations of the federal computer crime statute - 18 U.S.C. §
1030 - do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense or
treat like offenders equally. By definition, sentencing is heavily
dependent on economic measures of harm, particularly the cost of
investigating the incident and restoring the system to its original
state. The legal definition of harm, however, does not accord with
the real world responses of investigators who want to get critical
systems running again to improve the state of security. Also, by
focusing on monetary loss, sentences do not adequately reflect
intangible damage that is difficult to value monetarily, like
invasions of privacy, access to or theft of data, or interruption of
service. The readily measured monetary loss like labor and
hardware costs associated with investigating, repairing, and
restoring compromised systems are more a function of victims'
choices than a reflection of perpetrator wrongdoing or system
interference. Sentencing law and practice has failed to
discriminate between harmful and trivial attacks. There are
several legal approaches we could adopt to mitigate these
problems. Ultimately, the question of how to remedy intrusions
depends on whether a consensus evolves about the value of the
rights and property interests that are commonly harmed by
computer attacks.
INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that the sentences courts have been imposing for
violations of the federal computer crime statute - 18 U.S.C. § 1030 -
do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense or treat like
offenders equally. The problem arises for both doctrinal and practical
reasons. By definition, sentencing is heavily dependent on economic
measures of harm, particularly the cost of investigating the incident
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and restoring the system to its original state. But the legal definition
of harm does not accord with the real world responses of investigators
who want to get critical systems running again to improve the state of
security. Also, by focusing on monetary loss, sentences do not
adequately reflect intangible damage that is difficult to value
monetarily, like invasions of privacy, access to or theft of data, or
interruption of service. The readily measured monetary loss like labor
and hardware costs associated with investigating, repairing and
restoring compromised systems are more a function of victims'
choices than a reflection of perpetrator wrongdoing or system
interference. Moreover, victims with more critical systems tend to
spend little time investigating the intrusion and a lot of time improving
security and getting the affected machines back on line. Sentencing
law excludes expenses incurred for both practices. Meanwhile,
victims with less important systems have the luxury of time to conduct
a full forensic investigation, which ratchets up prison terms. Thus,
sentencing law and practice has failed to discriminate between harmful
and trivial attacks.
There are several legal approaches we could adopt to mitigate
these problems. Obviously, courts could take practical steps to ensure
that victims do not overstate the economic costs of remediation,
including requiring accurate and complete documentation from
victims. Raising the burden of proof at sentencing would encourage
this practice. Another answer might be to reduce the weight given to
economic loss and more heavily weigh factors like the number of
victims, nature of information accessed by the attacker, nature of the
system attacked, or criminal scienter. The sentencing guidelines have
started down this path by adding sentencing adjustments to reflect the
number of victims, interference with critical infrastructure, and the
like. But, adding adjustments will not fix the problem if economic
costs continue to weigh so heavily in the sentencing process.
Sentences will still be unfair and unequal, however; they will just be
more severe. Ultimately, the question of how to remedy intrusions
depends on whether a consensus evolves about the value of the rights
and property interests that are commonly harmed by computer attacks.
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MEASURING ECONOMIC LOSS IS FUNDAMENTAL IN
COMPUTER CRIME CASES
Computer crime sentencing requires courts to value the damage
caused by a computer intrusion. In 2005, U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in United States v. Booker and United States v. FanFan
1
changed the way federal courts sentence in criminal cases. The
decisions stem from prior case law holding that a defendant has a right
to trial by jury for any factor that increases the defendant's sentence. 2
Booker and FanFan then held that the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, to the extent that they are mandatory, violate the
Constitution when the total offense level upon which the trial court
sentences include aggravating factors not found to be true beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury.3 A different majority of the Court then
held that the Guidelines are acceptable so long as they are not
mandatory.4 Courts are free to be guided by the Guidelines but need
not sentence in accordance with them, and sentencing decisions will
be reviewed for "reasonableness." 5 The amount of harm a defendant
caused is relevant to sentencing courts. Courts will calculate that harm
in accordance with both statutory and Guideline definitions.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1030, prohibits unauthorized access to computer systems. 6
Damage, expressed in terms of monetary loss, is important in
computer crime cases in three ways: (1) it is an element of the crime;
(2) it is a major determinative factor in sentencing; and (3) it is
fundamental to restitution. While the statute clearly contemplates
intangible harms from unauthorized access to data and systems, it
requires fact finders to express those harms in economic terms.
I United States v. Booker, United States v. FanFan, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (case opinions are
combined).
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S 296 (2004).
3 Booker, FanFan, 543 U.S. at 245. (Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion on this issue,
with Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joining.)
4 Id. at 259. (Justice Breyer wrote the Court's opinion on this question, with the Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg joining.)
5 Id. at 263-264.
618 U.S.C. § 1030 (2005).
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Prior to 2001, section 1030 focused almost exclusively on
economic harm from damage to computers and computer systems.
Subsections (a)(1)-(4) have not been amended. Subsection (a) of the
statute addresses unauthorized access to classified information.
Subsection (a)(2) makes unauthorized access and obtaining any
information from a protected computer criminal, but is only a
misdemeanor. Subsection (a)(3) criminalizes access that interferes
with the ability to use a computer exclusively for government use.
Subsection (a)(4) criminalizes access with the intent to defraud if the
intruder obtains anything of value. Prior to the 2001 amendments,
subsection (a)(5) criminalized transmissions or access that caused
damage, where damage was defined as any impairment to the integrity
or availability of data, a program, a system, or information that causes
loss aggregating to at least $5000 to one or more person during any
one-year period as an element of the offense.7 Without sufficient loss,
there was no offense under (a)(5). For access to private systems, the
statute required a showing of economic harm, or else, the offense was
a misdemeanor.
The statute generally defines damage as including interference
with the integrity of the system and then gives specific examples of
more tangible losses, including "the cost of responding to an offense,
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,
system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any
revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred,8
because of interruption of service." Thus, loss is a critical element in
defining whether a crime has occurred.
Amendments to the statute in 2001 added some special kinds of
non-economic harm that could substitute for showing $5000 in loss.
The non-economic harms are:
the modification or impairment, or potential modification or
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis,
treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; [access that
causes] physical injury to any person; a threat to public
health or safety; or damage affecting a computer system
used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the
718 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).
818 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).
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administration of justice, national defense, or national
security.9
A few years after these amendments, in 2004, the United States
Sentencing Commission issued new sentencing guidelines with
adjustments for violations creating these non-economic harms.
However, as discussed below, the adjustments are minor add-ons
contemplating that the largest factor in computer crime sentencing will
remain economic loss.
Prior to 2005, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines) regulated all federal criminal sentencing. The Guidelines
were promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission at the behest of
Congress to limit judicial discretion and impose order on federal
sentencing across districts. The Guidelines establish a base offense
level (BOL) for various crimes, and then list various factors that
increase or decrease the sentence (generally called adjustments). Once
the sentencing court determines the total offense level, taking all the
mitigating and aggravating factors into consideration, and considers
the defendant's prior criminal history, the Guidelines prescribe a
period of incarceration. 10  In the absence of extraordinary
circumstances, the sentencing court must choose a sentence within the
narrow range of months of incarceration the Guidelines prescribe.
Economic loss is a major factor in computer crime sentencing
under the Guidelines. For the purposes of sentencing, loss is defined
in the same economic terms as under the statute. That monetary value
is then heavily weighted in sentencing. Section 2B 1.1 of the
Guidelines applies to CFAA violations. Section 2B1.1 has a BOL of
six and dictates a two to thirty level upward adjustment for loss.1 If
loss is $30,000, the loss adjustment is six levels. Thus, at $30,000 loss
or more, over half of the defendant's sentence may be determined by
loss alone.
12
918 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii)-(v).
10 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2005).
11 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B.lI(b)(1)(D) (2005) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
12 The BOL for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 that do not involve state secrets is six (6).
U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1 (a)(2). The Guidelines add an additional six (6) levels for loss greater than
$30,000, and continue increasing up to an additional thirty (30) levels. Since the maximum
sentence for a first time violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 is ten years, you can get the maximum
at a level thirty, or a loss of $50,000,000 without any other aggravating factors.
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Finally, the amount of economic loss directly affects restitution
orders. Under non-mandatory restitution provisions, the court is to
consider the amount of the loss sustained by each victim as a result of
the offense. 13 In the case of an offense that damages or causes loss to
property, the statute requiring mandatory restitution requires
defendants to pay:
the greater of--
(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss,
or destruction, or
(ii) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less
the value (as of the date the propert is returned) of any part
of the property that is returned... i d
Defendants also must "reimburse the victim for lost income and
necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred
during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense
or attendance at proceedings related to the offense."" The federal
code establishes a procedure whereby the U.S. Probation Department
collects evidence from victims, prosecution, and defense about the
appropriate amount of restitution. 16  Whatever restitution scheme
applies, sentencing courts are obligated to put a monetary value on the
harm from the offense and to receive input, either directly or
indirectly, through the probation department from both the
government and the defendant.
Statutory and Guideline definitions require economically
expressible losses for prosecution and punishment of computer
intrusions. As courts look to the cost of investigation and remediation
as a measure of a defendant's guilt, cases involving intangible harms,
1318 U.S.C. § 3663 (2005).
14 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
1518 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4). At least one court has held that restitution following conviction of
18 U.S.C. § 1030 is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. See United States v. Harris, 302
F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that restitution following conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 1030
is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3664A(b)(4)).
1618 U.S.C. § 3664(a).
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but no economic losses, are unlikely to be pursued. Thus, invasions of
victim privacy, for example, will not be prosecuted unless the victim
can come up with additional economic harms. Section 1030 provides
a civil remedy for victims, and in several cases, victims have failed to
obtain redress because harm to their privacy interests was not
economically calculated to exceed $5000.1
In 2004, the Guidelines were amended to include a number of
upward adjustments for non-economic factors. These include number
of victims, 8 misappropriation of a trade secret with the knowledge or
intent to benefit a foreign government, 19 the conscious or reckless risk
of death or serious bodily injury, attacks on critical infrastructure or
national security machines," and violations with the intent to obtain
personal information. 22 Given the recency of these amendments and
the current confusion over the status of the sentencing guidelines,
there has been little data to determine the effect of these changes.
However, loss still remains the single, overwhelmingly important
factor. Economic loss can add anywhere from a minimum of two to a
maximum of thirty levels to a sentence.23 The non-economic factors,
however, generally result in an upward adjustment of only two levels,
and in serious cases involving interference with critical infrastructure
systems, six levels, but no more.
24
17 For example, plaintiffs have filed class action suits against companies that place "cookies"
on the computers of website visitors for the purpose of collecting private data for marketers.
While the courts have found that cookies are an unauthorized access to computers in violation
of the actus reus provisions of § 1030, the invasion did not cause $5000 in loss and thus
dismissed the suit. See In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1791 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (Plaintiffs failed to show that privacy invasion was an economic loss in the amount of
$5000 or show non-economic damage of the type listed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(e)(8)(B)-(D)).
18 U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)-(C) (2005).
19 U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(5).
20 U.S.S.G. § 2BI.I(b)(12)(A).
21 U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1(b)(14)(A)(i)(I).
22 U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1(b)(14)(A)(i)(II).
23 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.l(b).
24 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2), (5), (12), (14).
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COMPUTER INVESTIGATION COSTS ARE A FUNCTION OF VICTIM
CHOICE, NOT OFFENSE CONDUCT
Incident investigation costs are clearly included in the statutory
definition of loss. Following a security breach, owners incur labor
costs for investigating the incident and fixing the vulnerability that
allowed unauthorized access. Owners may also incur labor and
hardware costs for upgrading or improving security measures like
firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Investigation costs should
be easily measured if the owner documents the activities responders
take and the hardware they use.
Despite the apparent ease of measurement, victims faced with
nearly identical security incidents will tally different losses. The
reason for this is that there is no one right way to do security incident
investigation. Victims' goals affect investigation decisions. Victims
may decide to restore a mission-critical machine to service with a
cursory investigation that adds up to little economic loss.
Also, victims can over- or under-report the cost of conducting an
investigation. Victims who want federal assistance in investigating or
prosecuting an attacker know that the higher the loss, the more likely
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will be interested. Victims
may choose an expensive investigation to reassure shareholders or the
public and to restore their reputation for security.
Security incident investigation is something of an art, and
investigations performed by different technicians will not take
anywhere near the same amount of time or resources. In 2001, the
Honeynet Project hosted a forensic challenge, publishing an image
reproduction of a compromised system, and challenged contestants to25
analyze the attack and report what they found. The contestants were
told to keep track of their time and were given the federal statutory
definition of loss as "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition
prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
,,26
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.
25 The Forensic Challenge, http://www.honeynet.org/challenge/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
26 Id. (referencing Dave Dittrich, Estimating the Cost of Damages Due to a Security Incident,
(Jan. 29, 2001) available at http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/faqs/incidentcosts.faq.)
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Participants were also instructed to assume that their annual salary was
$70,000.27
The challenge received thirteen entries. The consensus was that
the analysis of this single-compromised system took quite a bit of
time. Contestants finished when the contest time ran out, not when
they were done. The average time spent per investiation was forty-
eight hours.28 The most time spent was 104 hours. The least was
ten. 30 The winning entry took thirty-seven hours and was submitted
by a single investigator with eight years of experience. 31  At the
$70,000 salary, the average cost per investigation was approximately
$2000.2
What these contest results show is that the cost of fixing a system
after an attack has more to do with what actions the victim takes than
with what the intruder did. Damage from an offense is a function of
the idiosyncrasies of incident investigation, including the skills,
experience, hourly rate, and remediation choices of the victim, and not
necessarily the offender's actions. As a result, similar offenders
committing similar offenses will be treated differently, because
victims will inevitably react differently to intrusions.
Beyond victim idiosyncrasies, intrusion response depends on the
victim's goals. The victim may want to perform a thorough analysis
of the incident to determine what happened and to learn from the
problem. He or she may want to perform a thorough analysis of the
incident for use in a legal case against the perpetrator. Or more
pressingly, the victim may want to get the computer systems back up
and running as quickly as possible to avoid business losses. Doing a
full-scale analysis for any purpose may interfere with restoring
27 The Forensic Challenge, supra note 25.
28 The Forensic Challenge, Results of the Forensic Challenge,
http://www.honeynet.org/challenge/results/index.htrl (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
29 Id.
30 Id.
311Id.
32 Id.
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services. The expense of identifying a perpetrator, versus putting the
services back on line, can be immense.33
The intrusions that took place in United States v. Butler34 illustrate
this point exactly. In Butler, I represented a man who created an
automated tool that used a known vulnerability to compromise
systems and install new codes that both patched the known
vulnerability and installed an unknown back door through which he
could regain access. Each system accessed by his tool was accessed in
exactly the same way, since the tool used an identical automated
process on each machine. Some system administrators restored their
machines from backup and reported a single hour of work. At
government pay rates, this was far less than the requisite $5000 of
loss. Other system administrators reported spending over thirty hours
examining the compromised machines, as well as examining other
machines that were not compromised, to investigate the attack. Here,
the costs were well above the $5000 threshold.35 The loss Butler
caused could be aggregated across machines as part of a similar course
of conduct. However, if Defendant A had compromised the first
system and Defendant B the second in identical ways, but unrelated
incidents, Defendant A would not be prosecuted, but Defendant B
would go to prison.
A system owner who decides to investigate will rack up more
losses in the form of labor costs than a system owner who decides that
the computers are mission-critical and have to be put back on line
immediately. As a result, the first incident will be punished more
harshly than the latter, though arguably the intrusion into the mission-
critical system was more disruptive than an attack on a system where
the owner had the luxury of time to investigate.
Not only is the decision of whether to investigate often inversely
related to the importance of the attacked system, it also may be based
33 See NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUBL'N No.
800-61, COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT HANDLING GUIDE (2004) § 3.3.3, available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61/sp800-61.pdf. ("Identifying the attacker can
be a time-consuming and futile process that can prevent a team from achieving its primary
goal-minimizing the business impact.") [hereinafter NIST GUIDE].
34 United States v. Butler, No. CROO-20096 JW/PVT (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 15, 2000)
(Sentencing hearing held on May 24, 2001).
35 Id.; Defendant's First Amended Sentencing Memorandum Motion for Departure Request
for Evidentiary Hearing, United States v. Butler, at 25 (filed May 14, 2001) (on file with
author).
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on efforts to remediate harm to a company's reputation rather than to
its computer systems. For example, in United States v. Heckenkamp,
36
the defendant was accused of altering an Internet auction site, eBay's
webpage. eBay had hired several expensive consulting firms to
investigate its website intrusion. Even though replacing the altered
page with the original is a simple process, the publicly traded compan-
probably felt it needed to do more to build customer confidence."
Potential harm to reputation caused the company to spend a lot more
on remediation and upgrades to reassure its customers and the public
than it otherwise would have done. Generally, U.S. law does not
compensate harm to reputation resulting from the publication of true
facts. If harm to reputation stems from the public realization that the
system was not, in fact, secure, or from public revelation of
information that makes a company look bad, the legal system may not
want to factor this specific injury into sentencing. But harm to
reputation also influences how much time and money a victim will
spend on remediation. Courts that defer to victim loss assessments
will have trouble excluding harm to reputation from sentencing
considerations.
When different victims treat an identical attack differently, vastly
disparate loss calculations result, and thus sentences vary as well. The
victim's choice about how to respond to a security incident is the
difference between innocence and prison, despite the fact that the
unauthorized access was exactly the same.
The judicial system often imposes liability on similar offenders
based on events outside of the perpetrator's control that are
nonetheless proximately caused by the illegal conduct. If I punch
someone, I have committed a battery. But if that person falls and hits
his or her head and dies, I can be prosecuted for manslaughter. In
computer crime prosecution, the difference is stark because of the
$5000 trigger for liability and the relatively steep increase in offense
level proscribed by the relevant sentencing guideline.
38
36 United States v. Heckenkamp, No. 00-CR-20355 JW/ALL (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 13, 2000)
(case terminated by plea and sentence April 27, 2005). A summary of this case is available on
the Dep't of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section website as a press
release, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/heckenkampSent.htm.
37 Id.
38 A defendant can go from zero to sixteen months in $30,000. U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1, and Ch.5,
Part A (Sentencing Table) (2004).
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Moreover, victims generally have incentives to mitigate harm
flowing from the illegal act. Few people want to make their injuries
worse. But victims who choose an expensive full-scale investigation
do not necessarily pay a penny more than victims who restore from
backup and put their systems back on line. In-house investigators get
the same yearly salary regardless of the choice. Indeed, there may be
an incentive to exaggerate. If the victim can portray the incident as
serious, federal law enforcement is more likely to get involved in the
investigation. Victims who inflate the number of hours spent on
remediation can end up saving money by shifting real investigation
and prosecution costs to the taxpayer.
Thus, the most easily measurable type of harm that accrues from a
computer attack is both unrelated to the severity of the intrusion and
subject to manipulation by victims. As a result, investigation costs do
not correlate with the invasiveness or disruptiveness of attacks.
INVESTIGATION AcTIvITiES FALL OUTSIDE
THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF LOSS
Courts have good cause to look more closely at victim loss
estimates because they tend to include losses that are excluded by law.
Despite the importance of "loss" in computer crime cases, the factor is
defined in a way that does not accord with the real-world effects of
computer crime. The CFAA defines loss as "any reasonable cost to
any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting
a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost,
cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service., 39 Loss does not include any costs incurred
improving the system, nor does it include costs for forensic
investigation. 4° The comments to the relevant Guideline 2B1.1
expressly exclude forensic costs, i.e. "costs to the government of, and
costs incurred by victims primarily to aid the government in, the
prosecution and criminal investigation of an offense." 41
39 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(ll) (2005).
40 See United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000) (the finder of fact
could consider only those costs that were a "natural and foreseeable result" of the defendant's
conduct, that were "reasonably necessary," and that would "resecure" the computer).
41 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(D) (2005).
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First, no victim wants to put the system back into its original
condition. Everyone wants to improve. Incident handlers do not
restore a compromised system to its "condition prior to the attack" as
contemplated by the definition. Prior to the attack, the system was
vulnerable. The administrator is going to improve the security of the
system so that the same attack will not be successful the next time.
Responders "harden" systems, install patches, and tighten network
perimeter security.
42
Second, victims invariably include forensic costs as part of labor in
response to an intrusion. First responders are taught to do a forensic
investigation if at all possible, even though the legal definition of loss
excludes forensic costs. Private and public organizations have
developed standards and training programs for these first responders.
For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publish the "Computer
Security Incident Handling Guide," which explores policies and
practices that public agencies and private sector businesses should take
following an attack.' The federally funded CERT Coordination
Center (CERT/CC) also publishes resources for private organizations
to build their own computer security incident response teams and to
train incident handlers. Its October 2005 publication, "State of the
Practice of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs)," is
a review and digest of the top incident handling resources.4 It covers
CSIRT services, projects, processes, structures, and literature, as well
as training, legal, and operational issues.
The training manuals stress the importance of investigating
incidents so that the information can be used in a subsequent civil or
criminal case. Obviously, the Department of Justice (DOJ) guide is
intended for law enforcement and for first responders to computer
crime scenes. The entirety of the manual advises following
appropriate forensic procedures with the intention of preserving
evidence for criminal prosecution.
42 If the intruder obtained passwords, changing passwords might be required to re-secure the
system as a result of the incident.
43 NIST GUIDE supra note 33.
44 See Georgia Killcrese et al., State of the Practice of Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) (Oct. 2003) available at http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/O3trOOl.pdf.
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The NIST Guide, however, is targeted to all first responders, not
only law enforcement and crime scene responders.4 5  It is
characteristic of the training that first responders receive in the public
and private sectors.46 First responders are told to collect evidence in a
way that will hold up in court.
Although the primary reason for gathering evidence during an
incident is to resolve the incident, it may also be needed for legal
proceedings. In such cases, it is important to clearly document how all
evidence, including compromised systems, has been preserved.
Evidence should be collected according to procedures that meet all
applicable laws and regulations, developed from previous discussions
with legal staff and appropriate law enforcement agencies, so that it
should be admissible in court. In addition, evidence should be
accounted for at all times; whenever evidence is transferred from
person to person, chain of custody forms should detail the transfer and
include each party's signature. A detailed log should be kept for all
evidence.
47
The NIST Guide also recommends that the incident handler have
forensic training so that she is familiar with legal rules and
proceedings.4 8  The Guide advises recovery actions, including
"restoring systems from clean backups, rebuilding systems from
scratch, replacing compromised files with clean versions, installing
patches, changing passwords, and tightening network perimeter
securitj (e.g., firewall rulesets, boundary router access control
lists)." 9 It also advises investigative actions, including validating the
attacker's IP address, scanning the attacker's systems, performing web
45 NIST GUIDE supra note 33 at § 1.3 at 1-1 ("This document has been created for computer
security incident response teams (CSIRTs), system and network administrators, security staff,
technical support staff, chief information officers (CIOs), and computer security program
managers who are responsible for preparing for, or responding to, security incidents.").
46 The NIST document was based on the advice of security experts at NIST, consulting firm
Booz Allen Hamilton, NASA, Indiana University, Center Education and Research in
Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), Purdue University, The U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs, Wells Fargo Bank, The University of Tulsa, CERT®/CC, MITRE
Corporation, The Ohio State University, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, The Federal
Computer Incident Response Capability (FedCIRC), and U.S. Dep't of Treasury.
47 NIST GUIDE supra note 33 at § 3.3.2 at 3-18.
48 ld. at 3-19.
49 NIST GUIDE supra note 33 at § 3.3.4 at 3-21.
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research on attacker handles or email addresses, searching incident
databases, and monitoring the attacker's electronic communications.
5 0
Thus, system administrators are trained to contemplate either a
criminal or civil action at the outset of the investigation. The guides
recommend time-consuming system review and evidence preservation
activities, which are useful only for legal cases. Procedures for
documenting how evidence has been preserved, collecting evidence in
accordance with laws and regulations, keeping chain of custody forms,
communicating with legal counsel, and interviewing witnesses, all are
part of building a legal case, not merely investigating what happened.
Forensic activities and training increase both the time spent by and
the hourly cost of the incident handler, despite the legal exclusion of
such costs.
This would not be a problem if courts scrutinized victim loss
estimates. However, courts are highly deferential to victims. A
review of the Department of Justice's selected computer crime cases,
published at http://www.clrbercrime.gov, shows thirteen cases
sentenced in 2003 and 2004.5 The information provided for six of the
thirteen cases includes both the government's statement of loss and the
court ordered restitution.52  In four of the six cases, the fine or
restitution order equaled or exceeded the government statement of
loss, indicating that the court adopted the government's loss
estimate.53 In one of the other two cases, the government's stated loss
was $100,000 and the court ordered $88,253.47 in restitution.54 In the
50 NIST GUIDE supra note 33 at § 3.3.3 at 3-20, 21.
51 Dep't of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Table of Computer
Intrusion Cases, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cccases.htmi (last visited October
26, 2005).
52 See id. (The six cases are United States v. Borghard, United States v. Dinh, United States v.
Ivanov, United States v. Shakour, United States v. Amato and United States v. Heckenkamp,
which have press releases summarizing the cases on the Dep't of Justice, Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property website cited supra note 51.)
53 See id. (These four cases are Borghard, Dinh, Amato, and Heckenkamp.)
54 See id. (This case was Shakour.)
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other, the government's estimated loss was $25 million, but the court
ordered no fine or restitution. 5
5
Courts could be less deferential if they had the documentation
necessary to parse through the time spent or the hourly rate to try to
excise extra costs motivated by forensic purposes. Unfortunately,
investigating FBI agents do not ask victims to keep track of their time
with the legal definitions of loss in mind. As a result, victims usually
submit to courts undifferentiated loss estimates with few sub-
categorizations that would aid a court in distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible loss inclusions. Victims simply are not
given the information necessary to avoid excessive loss calculations.
There is little or no incentive or format in which the victim can
estimate damages in a legally useful way. For example, in United
States v. Butler, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) investigated the intrusions into Air Force computers. That
investigation led to the identification of Butler as the perpetrator. The
Special Agent in charge provided the FBI with a flat number of
investigative hours the AFOSI devoted to the case. He provided no
supporting documentation, list of type of work done, or records of
when the work was performed. For sentencing, the government
obtained another document from AFOSI detailing the work. The total
number of hours on the worksheet was different from the number
initially reported. Again, it contained no indication of what work was
done. There was, therefore, no way to tell whether the calculation
included time spent on activities explicitly excluded from the loss
calculation. The court, nonetheless, sentenced Mr. Butler based on
this information because it was a "reasonable" calculation.
56
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AT SENTENCING Is Too Low To INCENTIVIZE
JUDGES To TAKE A SERIOUS LOOK AT Loss ESTIMATES BY VIcTIMS
It is unsurprising that sentencing courts defer to prosecution and
victim loss estimates. Judges do not have the expertise to second-
guess a victim's assessment of what was required to investigate and
fix his system. As the Honeynet data suggests, experts in the field can
55 See id. (This case was Ivanov. A more in depth analysis of the data on computer crime
sentencing is needed to confirm whether this assertion that courts are extremely deferential is
true.)
56 United States v. Butler, supra note 34.
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differ widely over the proper course of an investigation.5 7 Judges have
little competency to question those decisions. However, the parties
could bring in experts to support and attack the loss estimate and
courts could make judgments based on testimony, as they do in other
areas of the law. The burden of proof at sentencing and the standard
of review on appeal are so low, especially now that application of the
Guidelines is discretionary, that trial courts feel confident that any
reasonable decision will be upheld.
The Guidelines do not limit loss in computer crime cases to
foreseeable damages. While the definition of loss for other white
collar fraud crimes punished under the same guideline includes only
reasonably foreseeable monetary harm,58 a special rule for computer
crime cases requires the court to include any reasonable cost to any
victim, "including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost,
cost incurred, or other damages incurred because of interruption of
service," regardless of whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable or
not.
59
Also, the Guidelines establish a lower burden of proof for loss
calculations in sentencing. Generally, the burden of proof required for
sentencing is by a preponderance of the evidence. ° However, the
Guidelines only require the judge to make a "reasonable estimate" of
the loss. 61 In other words, the government only needs to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court made a
reasonable estimate of loss, and that estimate is a factual finding
entitled to great deference. 62
Loss will continue to be a critical factor in sentencing decisions;
however, courts will still be under little or no pressure to scrutinize
57 See, The Forensic Challenge, Results of the Forensic Challenge, supra note 28. The
competing teams performed very different incident analyses.
58 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3 (2005).
59 U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.1, cmt. n.3(a)(v)(III).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Collins,
109 F.3d 1413, 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
61 See U.S.S.G. §2B 1.1, cmt. n.3.
62 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)-(f) (2005).
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loss estimates, because the overall sentence only needs to be
reasonable.
COMPUTER INTRUSIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY INTANGIBLE HARM
NOT READILY QUANTIFIABLE IN ECONOMIC TERMS
Much of the harm flowing from computer intrusions is even harder
to evaluate. Loss of privacy, access to confidential data, system
unavailability or downgrade in system performance, and sometimes
the revelation of previously unknown information all harm victims.
The harm can be non-economic and may not require the victim to
make any financial expenditure.
It is difficult to put a price tag on the harm caused when once
private data is no longer secret. For example, I am adversely affected
by knowing that an intruder, whether a stranger or someone I know,
read my email without my permission. Information I wanted to keep
private no longer is. There is a chance that the intruder will use the
information against me in some way or that it will be embarrassing.
Some victims of privacy invasion describe a psychological sense of
violation. Yet there is no amount of money that would repair this
harm. Money cannot make the victim whole.
Even where information is commercially valuable, unlike the
email in the above example, there may be no readily measurable
economic loss when an outsider merely accesses the information.
Customer lists, trade secret information, or software programs under
development may have no readily ascertainable market value. It is
unclear whether that value diminishes if the owner of the information
retains the full ability to exploit it following unlawful access, for
example when an intruder learns of company trade secrets, but does
not disseminate them further. In the case of United States v. Mitnick,63
the defendant accessed proprietary data stored on Sun Microsystems
computers. Sun claimed that Mitnick caused $80 million in damages
by copying the source code for its Solaris operating system. This
number represented the entire research and development costs for
Solaris.64 Yet, Mitnick did not disseminate the source code, and Sun
was able to retain complete control of the product, later deciding to
give the operating system to customers for free.
63 United States v. Mitnick, 145 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1998).
64 Douglas Thomas, How Much Damage Did Mitnick Do?, WIRED NEWS, May 5, 1999,
http://wired-vig.wired.com/news/politics/O, 1283,19488,00.html.
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Did Mitnick cause Sun no damage because he simply copied
something that they were giving away for free, or did he cause $80
million in damage? Clearly, a trade secret does not necessarily lose all
value to the owner simply because it is no longer secret from the
attacker. Equally clear is that the victim suffers some harm from loss
of total secrecy. The owner does not know how far the secret was
disseminated and experiences some amount of uncertainty as to the
continuing viability of the secret nature of the information. But, that
uncertainty is not a kind of harm that is readily expressed monetarily.
In January and February of 2000, attacks took down several major
webpages, including Yahoo!.65 Yahoo!, which makes money from
advertising, was down for several hours but was eventually restored.
Yahoo! failed to display ads to its users during that time period, but
did it lose any revenue? Would the attacker have been criminally
responsible if an advertiser cancelled a million dollar contract with
Yahoo! as a result of learning that the site was not immune to such
attacks?
These difficult questions simply illustrate that the damages
characteristically caused by computer intrusions are not readily
expressed in economic terms.
Given the theoretical problems with converting intangible harm to
economic losses, it is not surprising that individuals, businesses, and
the government have trouble calculating the cost of computer
intrusions or computer viruses. The problem is exacerbated because
legal doctrine, government agencies, and private industry have not
developed any guidelines or methodologies for making such estimates.
When asked to measure harm from computer intrusions, victims are
not given any guidelines or methodologies with which to do so. The
Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation survey CSI members every year about a host of security
issues, including number of security incidents and their cost. This
report is the only one of its kind and is widely cited by media and
industry. There are statistical and methodological problems with the
survey that others have identified.66 But for the purposes of this paper,
one of the most interesting findings is that survey respondents have
65 Corey Grice, How a Basic Attack Crippled Yahoo, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 7 2000,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-236621 .html.
66 See, e.g., Julie C.H. Ryan & Theresa I. Jefferson, The Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Statistics
in Information Security Research, Proceedings of the 2003 ASEM National Conference, St.
Louis, MO.
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trouble figuring out how to quantify loss. The 2004 survey, as in other
years, showed that almost half of the organizations were unable or
unwilling to quantify financial losses.67 A much higher percentage of
2005 survey respondents were able to estimate financial losses.
Interestingly, the 2005 loss estimates were substantially lower than
those in 2004, a "whopping 61% decline," 68 which CSI attributes to
accurate measurements of explicit losses like the cost to reconfigure
and reinstall software, but the difficulty in calculating implicit harm
like lost revenue. 69  Nonetheless, the media seems to trade in
undocumented assessments of economic loss which, to even the least
critical reader, are suspiciously high. For example, news outlets
widely reported the mi2g consultancy firm's estimate that January
2004's "mydoom" virus cost businesses $38.5 billion worldwide.7 °
Computer intrusions cause harm, but neither the legal system nor
industry understands how to measure that harm. By insisting on an
economic measure of harm, sentencing is too malleable by both
victims and law enforcement. Meanwhile, harm from system
malfunction, data loss, or privacy invasion goes under-punished.
Recent Guideline amendments providing upward adjustments for
multiple victims, invasions of privacy, theft of trade secrets, and
interference with government functionality or critical infrastructure
may be a step in the right direction. By identifying aggravating
offense characteristics without reference to money, sentencing law can
better address intangible harms. But the current scheme only imposes
these adjustments on top of the previously existing adjustments for
financial loss. Adding adjustments will not fix the problems set forth
above. Sentences will still be unfair and unequal. In addition,
intangible harm will still be undervalued. For example, under the
current Guidelines, "intent to obtain personal information" results in
only a two-level increase, as does the theft of a trade secret for a
67 CSI/FBI Annual Survey (2004), at 11, CSI/FBI Annual Survey (2005), at 2, 14. In 2004,
494 respondents, only 269 provided loss estimates. In 2005, of 700 respondents, 639 provided
loss estimates. The survey is available at no cost from http://www.gocsi.com.
68Id. at 14.
69 1d. at 15.
70 mi2g Ltd., My Doom Becomes Most Damaging Malware as SCO Is Paralysed, Feb. 1,
2004, http://www.mi2g.con/cgi/mi2g/press/010204.php.
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foreign agent.71 This is the equivalent increase imposed for a $5001loss. '
CONCLUSION: WE SHOULD MovE AWAY FROM SENTENCING BASED So
HEAVILY ON THE COST OF CLEANUP AND TOWARDS A SCHEME THAT
DEFINES AND TARGETS INTANGIBLE HARMS
Since cost of cleanup can vastly differ for the same offense
conduct punishment levels do not reflect the seriousness of the
offense. 3 Cost of cleanup does not necessarily reflect the sensitivity
of the victim to intrusions, since the most loss adverse victims will
probably spend less time investigating in favor of restoring service to
users. Defining damage in terms of the victim's investigation and
remediation costs does not promote prosecution of the more disruptive
attacks. As I argue above, there are practical and doctrinal reasons
that the current computer crime sentencing scheme is neither fair nor
accurate. The statutory definition of loss includes investigation and
remediation, but victims do not investigate or remediate in the way the
law contemplates. Rather, victim choices have little to nothing to do
with whether the attack was harmful or trivial.
Moreover, trivial attacks may be prosecuted more severely than
destructive ones. Assume the defendant accessed a webserver through
a known vulnerability and changed the webpage in Incident A. In
Incident B, the defendant gained unauthorized access to a university
computer and deleted all the data stored on the system. In Incident A,
the webserver owner could put the system back simply by restoring
the proper name to the file containing the website images. However,
the owner chooses to hire expensive outside consultants to review all
the computers on the system and make sure there are no other
intruders or changes, taking a week's worth of work at a high hourly
rate. In Incident B, the researchers restore the data from backup,
taking just a couple of hours of a graduate student's time. In Incident
A, the attacker could go to prison. In Incident B, despite the attacker's
destructive intent and effect, the offense most likely would not be
prosecuted at all.
71 U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.1(b)(14)(A)(i) (2005); U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(5).
72 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(B).
73 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2005).
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Sentencing goals in the United States federal criminal justice
system are: (1) to provide punishment levels that "reflect the
seriousness of the offense;" 74 (2) to "provide "... fairness in meeting
the purposes of sentencing;" 75 (3) to provide defendants "with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner" where rehabilitation is
appropriate; (4) "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;" 77 (5) "to provide just punishment; ' 78 (6) to maintain
"sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account
in the establishment of general sentencing practices;"79 (7) "to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant;"' (8) "to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct;"81 and (9) "to
provide certainty... in meeting the purposes of sentencing." 82 Goals
1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 are not met by the current practice in computer crime
sentencing.
My argument suggests several ways in which the current computer
crime statute and sentencing scheme should change. Most basically,
the sentencing process needs to discriminate between included and
legally excluded harms. To account for investigation and to exclude
reputational harm, system improvements and forensic costs,
investigators and victims must be trained to maintain and provide
accurate and complete documentation of post-intrusion activities.
Courts should require such documentation and scrutinize it. Where
74 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
75 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2005).
76 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
77 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
78 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
79 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
80 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
82 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
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courts feel a lack of competence in assessing damage estimates,
experts can be useful. However, courts have no incentive to scrutinize
victim loss estimates and to discriminate between proper and improper
damage claims when the burden of proof at sentencing is so low.
More fundamentally, I believe sentencing computer crimes based
mainly on economic loss is a mistake. These types of crimes are
characterized by intangible harms which are difficult to measure
economically. Fields of economics are devoted to measuring harm
from security incidents, the value of privacy, and other intangibles.
But these academic endeavors are too speculative, malleable, and
theoretical to be the basis for prison terms.
The current Sentencing Guidelines may be moving in the right
direction by identifying the type of harm that the statute seeks to
prevent and by scaling the sentence accordingly. If the attack was
fundamentally an invasion of privacy, courts should impose one
sentence. If the attack was targeting critical infrastructure, courts
should impose a higher sentence, regardless of the cost of
investigation or repair. Attacks with more victims could be sentenced
more severely than lesser intrusions. Attacks for the purposes of
economic espionage would be sentenced more severely than website
defacements. As it has begun to do, the United States Sentencing
Commission could identify the harms the statute seeks to prevent and
suggest adjustments accordingly.
To do this well, any sentencing authority has to consider computer
crime prohibitions, the interests legislatures seek to protect through
such statutes, and the relative importance of these interests to society.
Ultimately, crafting appropriate sanctions for intrusions requires more
understanding of and agreement about the social value of the rights
and property interests commonly harmed by computer attacks. This is
a worthwhile endeavor. Currently, we have Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act cases, which hold that the statute prohibits issuing patently
overbroad subpoenas for email83 and for operating search engines, "4
practices that fall outside the common understanding of illegal
computer hacking. Giving greater consideration to the rights and
interests we are trying to protect with computer crime legislation may
lead to the creation of a statute that protects us more effectively.
83 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978 (91h Cir. 2003), amended by and rehg denied, 359
F.3d 1066 (9'h Cir. 2004), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 48 (2004).
84 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
2006]
